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Corporate Recruitment and Networks in Germany: 
Change, Stability, or Both? 
Elena Semenova ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Rekrutierung von CEOs und ihre Netzwerke in Deutschland: 
Wandel, Stabilität, oder beides?«. This article analyzes the recruitment of CEOs 
at the 100 largest German companies, focusing on how the transition from 
“Deutschland AG” to integration with European and global markets has impact-
ed the recruitment and career patterns as well as networks of German CEOs. 
This study found signs of both continuity and change. The percentage of tech-
nically educated German CEOs, as well as CEOs with a Ph.D., continues to be 
quite high. In contrast, the professionalization of managerial positions in Ger-
many, the decline in corporate tenure, and a gradually opening recruitment 
market reflect the changing orientation of German corporate culture toward 
international markets. The analysis of the overall corporate network and its 
components reveals that the density of the overall corporate network in Ger-
many has increased, which corresponds to the increased number of CEOs with 
shared alumni experience as well as with additional connections through vari-
ous policy associations. The density of co-worker networks has, however, de-
creased. The structure of the German corporate network is not unified but con-
sists of a set of highly dense groups (cliques). The findings and their 
implications for further research on change in German corporate structures are 
discussed. 
Keywords: Economic elite, CEO, manager, career, connection, Germany. 
 
One of the most fundamental issues in elite studies is the power of economic 
elites. It is widely recognized that managers, owners or major stockholders of 
the largest national and international enterprises (e.g., Bill Gates of Microsoft 
or Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook) exercise considerable political power as a 
result of their economic power. They are also an essential element of the over-
all power structure of contemporary capitalist societies. It is also assumed that 
these elites are not cohesive; they compete with one another in the pursuit of 
their specific interests. Moreover, they compete with political elites, and, at the 
same time, neither can exist without the other [‘a dissociative symbiosis,’ as 
Best called it (2019, 45)]. In the context of this HSR Special Issue, this article 
deals with the overall structure of economic power in Germany by focusing on 
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corporate (economic) elites, i.e., CEOs of the largest national and international 
enterprises. 
1.  Capitalism: German Style 
The literature on comparative capitalism treats Germany as a prominent exam-
ple of an “institutionalized high-wage economy” (Streeck 1997) or “Rhenish 
capitalism” (Windolf and Nollert 2001; Albert and Gonenc 1996), which dif-
fers pronouncedly from American “liberal market economy” (Hall and Soskice 
2001, 21-33). Specifically, in the Federal Republic of Germany, a specific set 
of formal and informal institutions (e.g., socially instituted markets and negoti-
ated firms with a long-term attachment of labor and capital) emerged in the 
postwar period and gave rise to what has been called diversified quality pro-
duction (Streeck 1997). This system was driven by three principal factors: large 
banks with an eye to long-term investment rather than short-term profit, incre-
mental innovation of products, and labor unions whose strength and role in 
management contributed to relatively high wages. 
This successful corporate model, which prevailed until the early 1990s, is 
generally referred to as “Deutschland AG” (“Germany Inc.”). Deutschland AG 
was considered highly stable because strong ties between companies in the 
industrial and financial sectors (Windolf and Nollert 2001) were a safeguard 
against such threats as hostile takeovers. Moreover, companies’ long-term main 
banks provided them with the capital they needed. Company shares were usual-
ly divided among few major blockholders. Finally, industrial relations were 
built on an elaborate system of supervisory boards and workers’ councils, 
which promoted a culture of consensus (Lütz and Eberle 2007). These industri-
al relations were also backed up by a system of wage autonomy, which led to 
the introduction of collective agreement on wages (Streeck 1997, 2006). In 
sum, in this environment of cooperation and shared economic prosperity rather 
than maximization of individual profit, companies in Deutschland AG were 
able to pursue long-term development strategies and concentrate on the produc-
tion of high-quality goods. 
With the integration of the German economy into the European and global 
markets and later German reunification, Germany’s corporate environment has 
had to adjust to new market realities, leading some scholars to talk about the 
‘crisis’ of Deutschland AG. Specifically, the growing disengagement of finan-
cial companies from the national company network has weakened the density 
of company ties (Höpner and Krempel 2006). Also, hostile takeovers have 
become more frequent (Streeck 2006; Lütz and Eberle 2007). Companies have 
shifted their interests toward profit maximization, gradually adopting strategies 
to increase their market capitalization (Höpner 2001). These changes in corpo-
rate strategies have accompanied transformations in industrial relations: trade 
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unions now struggle with a decline in membership and a diminution in the 
power of collective agreements (Doellgast and Greer 2007). All of these 
changes in the corporate culture and corporate financing systems have affected 
German companies. 
How this market integration has affected Germany’s corporate culture and 
corporate environment, including recruitment patterns and career trajectories 
among Germany’s top managers, is an area of some disagreement among re-
searchers. Some have argued that despite the inevitable impacts on the corpo-
rate environment and company strategies, corporate recruitment in Germany is 
characterized by impressive stability (e.g., Gergs and Schmidt 2002; Hartmann 
2006). Others have discovered notable changes in corporate recruitment and 
linked them to the crisis of Deutschland AG (e.g., Höpner 2003). 
The available data has been used to support arguments on both sides of this 
issue. In this article, I provide new data on the recruitment of chief executive 
officers (CEOs) from the 100 top companies in Germany in the 2010s in order 
to evaluate the degree to which recruitment and career patterns of top managers 
have changed but also to some degree remained the same in the wake of the 
“crisis” of Deutschland AG. The results of this study will be presented in light 
of existing scientific discourse on corporate recruitment in Germany. 
In addition to the analysis of corporate recruitment, my analysis takes into 
account the structure of corporate networks in Germany, which will be exam-
ined by Social Network Analysis (SNA). Network analyses of corporate gov-
ernance in Germany have primarily dealt with the question of networks be-
tween financial and industrial companies (e.g., Höpner and Krempel 2006) and 
interlocking directorates – i.e., the practice of serving on multiple corporate 
boards, a widespread phenomenon among German corporate board members 
(Ziegler 1981; Albach and Kless 1982; Pappi, Kappelhoff and Melbeck 1987; 
Windolf and Nollert 2001; Entorf et al. 2009; Pfannschmidt 1993). Studies 
have revealed that the personnel and financial networks between the industrial 
and financial sectors in Germany are strongly interconnected. However, in this 
study, I will take into account an aspect of corporate networking that has been 
overlooked in existing studies, despite its apparent significance: networks 
among top German CEOs that have to do with ties other than those of inter-
locking directorates. This analysis will address this blind spot in the existing 
research by analyzing various kinds of networks among German CEOs and 
providing a broader and more nuanced look at changes to corporate networks in 
post-Deutschland AG. 
This article consists of four sections. After the introduction in section 1, sec-
tion 2 gives a brief review of the literature on corporate recruitment in Germa-
ny. Section 3 presents an empirical analysis of the recruitment patterns among 
German CEOs, with a focus on four aspects of corporate recruitment: educa-
tional levels attained by CEOs, the frequency of in-house careers, CEO candi-
dates’ working experience, and their career tenure (e.g., Hartmann 1996; Freye 
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2010). Section 4 presents an empirical analysis of a variety of networks among 
the nation’s top CEOs with an eye to attaining a deeper perspective on the 
corporate network structure in Germany that goes beyond a consideration of 
interlocking directorates. After a discussion of the results of the analysis, I will 
conclude with the insights gained from looking at a variety of forms of net-
working that have emerged within Germany’s changing corporate culture. As I 
will argue, the recruitment patterns and networking as seen from these addi-
tional angles reflects movement away from some of the principals of Deutsch-
land AG but at the same time signals a hesitancy toward simply adopting the 
Anglo-Saxon corporate model. 
2.  Studies on the Recruitment of Germany’s Managers 
One of the most prominent approaches to studying German corporate leader-
ship is to focus on company managers and board members, who are defined as 
the most powerful sectoral elites (Hartmann 2018, 398). From the 1950s to the 
1970s, elite studies focused on the recruitment and attitudes of corporate elites, 
looking particularly at social background (and habitus), educational back-
ground, and the career patterns of managers and corporate leaders (Hartmann 
1956; Pross and Boetticher 1971; Kruk 1972). This type of study was less 
common during the 1980s (Poensgen and Lukas 1982) but has experienced a 
resurgence in the 1990s and 2000s (Hartmann 1996, 2006; Gergs and Pohl-
mann 1999; Gergs, Hausmann, and Pohlmann 1997; van Veen and Elbertsen 
2008). Research on economic elites has shown that German managers are often 
recruited from families with a high socio-economic status (Hartmann 2006). 
Top positions in corporations are almost exclusively controlled by men, as is 
also the case in France, the UK, and Spain (Hartmann 2018, 407). German 
managers typically have educational backgrounds in the technical sciences and 
have pursued in-house careers within the same company (Hartmann 1956; 
Hartmann 1996). 
The major shortcoming of these studies focusing on corporate leaders is that 
they usually ignore possible connections between the type of national economy 
in which these leaders operate and the recruitment features of economic elites 
that are specific to those economies. 
Sociological management studies have done a better job than elite studies 
when it comes to explicitly connecting specific types of national economies to 
the kinds of managers that succeed within those economic models. In particu-
lar, sociological management studies have highlighted the interrelation between 
company structure, company environment, type of production regime, and the 
careers of managers in different production regimes. Within this line of re-
search, many cross-national studies on economic elites have been conducted, 
creating the basis for identifying differences in the recruitment and career pat-
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terns found among managers in Germany (and Continental Europe) vs. their 
Anglo-Saxon counterparts (Glover 1976; Maurice, Sorge and Warner 1980; 
Egan 1997; Windolf 2003). The biggest shortcoming of the sociological man-
agement literature has been its focus on national settings at a specific period in 
time. These studies have therefore failed to take into account the significant 
factor of changes in corporate strategies within the respective countries. 
Economic sociology offers an approach that overcomes this shortcoming by 
considering the formation of corporate leadership within specific national set-
tings from a longitudinal perspective. Most researchers in economic sociology 
have focused on the notion of corporate control and its importance for the way 
corporations function (Fligstein 2001). When changes occur that affect the 
understanding of who is in control in a particular corporate environment, those 
changes trigger expectations among managers concerning the kinds of prere-
quisites they will need to fulfill in order to meet current and future challenges 
(Franks and Mayer 1990; O’Sullivan 2001). Studies on corporate control in 
Germany have discovered that German companies are highly interconnected 
through the system of interlocking directorates, and many companies are fami-
ly owned (Fohlin 2005). A shortcoming of economic sociology literature is that 
it mostly neglects important connections between models of corporate control, 
the economy, and recruitment of economic elites. 
Researchers focusing on the highest echelons of corporate elite have argued 
that although the corporate environment has changed since reunification, re-
cruitment patterns of top managers have altered less than one might expect. For 
example, Gergs and Schmidt (2002) have highlighted the remarkable stability 
of German managers’ career patterns. In particular, they have stressed the 
persistence of technical expertise and the dominance of in-house careers. 
Hartmann (2006) has also generally painted a picture of continuity in the re-
cruitment patterns, although his findings do suggest that some of the recruit-
ment patterns of German managers have changed; in particular, the proportion 
of CEOs with typical in-house careers has decreased, as was also the case with 
CEOs educated in law. Thus even researchers such as Hartmann (2006, 452-4) 
who point to signs of continuity generally agree that Deutschland AG has been 
experiencing a massive pressure for change and that this pressure has changed 
the overall corporate environment. 
Economic sociologists who have analyzed the changes in the professional 
background of German top managers have concluded that increasingly market-
oriented corporate strategies have led corporate elites to become more profes-
sionalized and more subject to competition. Specifically, Höpner (2003) and 
Freye (2010) have highlighted the growing proportion of CEOs educated in 
economics and the gradual opening of the corporate recruitment market to 
external contenders. The declining tenure of CEOs also signifies the increased 
competition for leading positions. Höpner (2003, 133-4) argues that the chang-
es in management recruitment stem from the changes in corporate strategies, 
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which have moved from stakeholder value to shareholder value. Beyer (2006), 
in a study of the 100 largest companies in Germany in 2003, found that compa-
nies run by CEOs with backgrounds in finance were less strongly integrated 
into the German company network than those run by managers with technical 
educations. From this he concluded that the growing recruitment of managers 
with finance backgrounds contributed to the crisis of Deutschland AG by intro-
ducing new corporate strategies. 
3. The Path to Becoming a CEO in Germany: Analysis of 
the Recruitment Patterns 
3.1  Educational Backgrounds of CEOs 
Researchers studying corporate recruitment in Germany have highlighted a 
unique pattern in the educational qualifications of German CEOs that has dis-
tinguished them from their Anglo-Saxon counterparts: a preponderance of 
managers with technical expertise. This dominance of technically trained Ger-
man managers was identified as early as the 1950s (Hartmann 1956) and has 
continued to exist after reunification (Egan 1997). The emergence and persis-
tence of this recruitment pattern were related to both the German innovation 
regime (Hall and Soskice 2001, 1-68) and the German type of capitalism 
(Streeck 1997). Since the 1980s, researchers have observed a change in the 
corporate discourse; namely, a shift took place from an emphasis on incremen-
tal technical innovation involving high-tech products to a focus on benchmark-
ing and financial performance (Münch and Guenther 2005). This change has 
led to an increasing pattern of recruiting financial specialists to the highest 
corporate ranks. The question that arises is whether this educational recruit-
ment pattern prevails into the 2010s.1  
In general, corporate leaders in Germany are highly educated (Table 1), and a 
university degree is considered a prerequisite for senior managerial positions (cf. 
Hartmann 1996). A noticeable proportion of the CEOs in the data had PhDs. 
                                                             
1  The companies analyzed here are taken from a list of the 100 largest (most profitable) 
companies in Germany, annually published by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ). I 
selected the largest companies because I assume that large and economically profitable en-
terprises have a greater impact on economic processes in their country than their smaller 
counterparts. The CEOs of the selected companies were identified by checking the respective 
company reports. Other sources of information used include the Munzinger database, issues 
of Wer ist Wer? (the German Who’s Who), information provided by the companies, and 
newspapers. In total, data were collected and coded for 100 individuals regarding their ca-
reer paths (if possible, since their university education) and the networks in which they were 
active before assuming a CEO position in one of the top companies. The cross-sectional data 
set includes two observation points – the years 2012 and 2015.  
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Following Freye (2010), we used a CEO’s engineering or science degree as a 
proxy for his or her technical expertise and a degree in business studies or eco-
nomics as a proxy for financial expertise. Because of the developments in the 
corporate culture of Germany, which has become more oriented toward financial 
markets, one might expect that the proportion of CEOs with degrees in engineer-
ing/science should decrease while the proportion of those with degrees in busi-
ness administration/economics should increase. Based on her sample of CEOs 
from the 50 top enterprises, Freye discovered that during the period 1960 to 
2000, the proportion of CEOs with degrees in engineering/science continually 
exceeded the proportion of those with degrees in economics. Strikingly, during 
the period from 2000 until 2005, the leading positions in German industry are 
more dominated by people with academic backgrounds in engineering and sci-
ence than in the 1970s and early 1980s (Freye 2010, 17-8).  
Table 1: The Major Recruitment and Career Patterns of German Top-Managers 
 Freye (2010) Semenova 
Variable 1990 1995 2000 2005 2012 2015 
Educational background (in %) 
CEOs with university degree N/P N/P N/P N/P 81 87 
CEOs with Ph.D. degree N/P N/P N/P N/P 36 37 
Technical/scientific degree  26 35 49 54 35 40 
Degree in economics/finance 60 56 34 42 47 50 
Degree in law 32 21 21 8 5 9 
In-house careers (in %) 
CEOs recruited from within their 
company (in %) 
N/P N/P N/P N/P 31 27 
CEOs recruited from within their 
corporate group (in %) 
N/P N/P N/P N/P 61 65 
CEOs with working experience 
abroad 
N/P N/P N/P N/P 55 59 
Professionalization 
Position from which a CEO was recruited (in %)     
CEO position N/P N/P N/P N/P 28 39 
Vice-CEO position N/P N/P N/P N/P 17 N/A 
Member of the executive board of 
directors 
N/P N/P N/P N/P 48 51 
Age at which candidates got their 
first-ever CEO position (in years) 
46.3 47.2 45.3 45.5 48.5 49.1 
Age and tenure 
Age at time of the recruitment  
(in years) 
51.1 52.2 52.4 50.7 55.0 54.0 
Mean tenure (in years, standard 
deviation) 
9.9 
(N/P) 
9.0 
(N/P) 
8.4 
(N/P) 
N/P 4.3 
(11.0) 
5.5 
(3.7) 
N 50 50 50 50 100 100 
Note: N/A – not applicable, N/P – not provided. 
Source: author’s own calculations and Freye (2010). 
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The current study reveals that these tendencies have slightly changed during 
the 2010s. In 20412 and 2015, half of all CEOs held university degrees in eco-
nomics/business studies, while the proportion of those with degrees in engi-
neering/science was as high as 40%. Although the number of technically edu-
cated CEOs seems to have decreased slightly, technical expertise is still 
widespread among German corporate leaders. 
In contrast, legal backgrounds have become less common among German 
CEOs. From the 1950s until the early 1990s, the proportion of CEOs with legal 
degrees equaled that of CEOs trained in economics – approximately 30% 
(Freye 2010, 18), although this proportion decreased during the 1990s (Hart-
mann 2006, 445). Our results support these findings. By 2015, less than 10% of 
CEOs held a law degree. 
In sum, compared to earlier generations of German corporate leaders, the 
current managers of the largest companies tend to study economics and busi-
ness instead of science and law. This shift in the educational credentials of top 
managers reflects a change in the corporate requirements of experience and 
knowledge among senior managerial personnel (Münch und Guenther 2005; 
Höpner 2003; Gergs and Schmidt 2002). 
3.2  The Closed Corporate Recruitment Market 
Educational background was not the only feature distinguishing German CEOs 
from their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. Another feature was the impact of sen-
iority and company loyalty on CEO appointments (Windolf 2003). German 
managers typically rise through the ranks in one company, slowly climbing the 
corporate ladder and eventually becoming CEO. The dominance of in-house 
recruitment for corporate leaders, which began in the 1980s and continued into 
the 1990s and the 2000s (Hartmann 2006), is a typical feature of German man-
agerial selection. The integration of the German economy into European and 
world markets would be expected to decrease the opportunities for in-house 
careers and to internationalize corporate personnel, as has been the case in 
Anglo-Saxon countries and France (Hartmann 1996, 71-2). 
Against these expectations, the German corporate market has remained rela-
tively closed, meaning that the majority of German managers are native Ger-
mans. For example, in the 2015 sample, 76% of CEOs were born in Germany, 
with an overwhelming dominance of managers from Western Germany (more 
than 98%). The remainder was born abroad, with approximately 5% hailing 
from the Netherlands and another 3% from the UK. Using work experience 
abroad as an indicator of internationality (Hartmann 2018, 410), we can con-
clude that German CEOs have become more mobile than was previously the 
case. In 2015, approximately 60% of German CEOs had gained working expe-
rience abroad, although most of these sojourners were employed in an office of 
their home company or home company group abroad. 
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This internationalization of corporate elites notwithstanding, the most spe-
cific feature of corporate recruitment in Germany has been and remains the 
frequency of in-house careers (Hartmann 1996, 71; Höpner 2003, 124). Ac-
cording to Freye (2010), from 1980 until 2000, approximately 60% of all Ger-
man CEOs pursued typical in-house careers. These results come with an im-
portant caveat. With the diversification of production and the changes in 
corporate structure in Germany, more corporate groups (i.e., collections of 
parent and subsidiary corporations that function under one source of control) 
have emerged. One can expect that this development will lead to the less fre-
quent occurrence of in-house careers. Freye (2010, 21) has shown that until the 
late 1980s, most in-house managers were recruited from within their compa-
nies, but since the 1990s, that proportion had decreased while the proportion of 
those recruited from within their corporate groups increased. Our findings 
confirm this trend. In 2015, only 27% of German CEOs of the top 100 compa-
nies were drawn from within their companies, but this proportion increases to 
as high as 64% if we consider those top managers who were recruited from 
within their corporate groups (Table 1). An additional aspect of in-house ca-
reers is the average number of years a candidate spends in the company or 
corporate group before assuming a corporate leadership position. In 2015, 
CEOs had to work in their companies for a full 16 years (the standard deviation 
is 11 years) before being promoted to their current positions. The high standard 
deviation signifies that there is not the easy route into German management. 
These findings reflect two significant trends. The first one is that the re-
cruitment market for CEOs of German companies is still relatively closed. The 
dominance of CEO candidates from the same company or corporate group is an 
indicator of the high value placed upon company loyalty and seniority for cor-
porate recruitment. It also may be considered a hindrance to the development 
of an external recruitment pool (Höpner 2003). The second tendency (i.e., the 
decreasing proportion of managers recruited from within the same company in 
favor of those recruited from within the same corporate group) reflects the 
growing structural differentiation between parent and subsidiary firms, which 
has provided more opportunities for employees to move from one department 
to another (Freye 2010). 
3.3  Professionalization among Corporate Managers 
In addition to in-house promotion, another essential aspect of corporate re-
cruitment is the growing professionalization of top managers. One of the indi-
cators of this process is the restricted mobility of candidates for CEO positions 
across different positions. Both in 2012 and 2015, half of all CEOs of top Ger-
man companies were drawn from executive boards of directors where they 
served as members (Table 1). The proportion of those who had held a CEO 
position in the same or another company group before their recruitment in-
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creased from 28% in 2012 to 39% in 2015. In contrast to the corporate recruit-
ment in 2015, in 2012, approximately 17% of CEOs were promoted from vice-
CEO positions. Finally, in 2015, some 4% of CEOs were the owners of their 
respective companies. 
The average promotion period between the first CEO position a candidate 
ever assumed and the CEO position in one of 100 top companies in Germany 
should also be taken into account. According to Freye (2010, 22), the average 
age at which managers had assumed their first-ever CEO positions declined 
from 51 years in 1960 to 46 years in 2005. In our study of managers of the top 
100 German companies, managers had assumed their first senior executive 
positions at an average age of 50. 
Combining these findings with the data on the prevalence of in-house pro-
motion, we find that the average career of a top-level manager in Germany 
unfolds within one company or corporate group, where future managers begin 
working in their late thirties. Eventually, the most talented managers are pro-
moted to CEO positions in subsidiary companies in their early fifties. To be-
come CEO of one of the 100 largest German companies, a candidate should be 
able to demonstrate a record as a successful CEO. Over time, this requirement 
becomes easier to fulfill because of corporate decentralization by large compa-
nies. They often reorganize into parent and subsidiary companies, with the 
latter run by independent CEOs. This change in corporate structures increases 
the number of available CEO positions and intensifies the competition among 
CEOs of subsidiaries and parent companies for the position of company group 
head (Freye 2010, 23-4). 
3.4  Age at the Time of Appointment and Average Tenure 
The dominance of in-house careers in German companies was named one of 
the reasons for a relatively high average age of CEOs at the time of their ap-
pointment. During the 1960s and 1970s, the average appointment age of Ger-
man managers was above 50, while their American counterparts assumed their 
positions in their early forties (Kruk 1972). Researchers highlighted, however, 
that although German CEOs were on average older than their counterparts in 
the US, their tenure as a CEO was also longer (Egan 1997, 5), which comes as 
no surprise considering the closeness of the recruitment market and high entry 
requirements for potential candidates. 
Freye (2010, 22) has noted that during the period from the 1960s until the 
early 2000s, German CEOs were on average 51-53 years old while being re-
cruited to their positions as managers of the 50 largest German companies. The 
dominance of middle-aged corporate leaders was a trend that has been evident 
since the 1960s; moreover, the standard deviation of the average age has been 
declining since the 1980s. 
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Because of the changes in corporate culture in Germany (among others, the 
orientation toward performance rather than seniority), one might expect the 
average age of CEOs, as well as their tenure as CEO, to decline. But based on 
our data, this expectation cannot be empirically confirmed. In 2015, the aver-
age age of German CEOs was 54–55 years, with a standard deviation of six 
years. 
However, the second assumption (i.e., the expectation of a decline in corpo-
rate tenure) can be confirmed. According to Freye (2010, 24), between the 
1960s and 1980s, the tenure of the average CEO fluctuated between 11 and 12 
years, decreasing to eight years in 2000. In our study, the average tenure fluc-
tuated between approximately four years (in 2012) and six years (in 2015). 
Although some of the corporate careers examined in the sample are still ongo-
ing, the data from two cross-sectional observations suggest that in the 2010s, 
the average tenure of a CEO of a top company matches the average duration of 
a CEO contract (i.e., five years). The study on managers’ success by PWC 
Strategy& (2018) has found out that the average tenure of German CEOs has 
declined from 8.4 years (2016) to 5.1 years (2017). In contrast, in 2017, the 
average tenure of a CEO around the world has been approximately seven years. 
The decline in the average CEO tenure at the top 100 German companies 
mirrors the changes in the corporate environment’s structure of opportunities. 
In the early observation years (1960-1980), more prolonged CEO tenures were 
related to the flat hierarchy of German companies, in which boards of directors 
share collective responsibility (Streeck 2006, 165). The development of clear 
hierarchies within companies and increased prominence for the CEO in the 
decision-making process (following the Anglo-Saxon model; Jackson and 
Höpner 2001) has tied the CEO’s fate with corporate performance. This change 
negatively affected the tenures of German CEOs in the 2000s and 2010s. These 
results were supported by the PWC Strategy& study (2018), according to 
which one in ten German CEOs has lost his or her position because of bad 
financial performance. 
4. The Structure of the Corporate Network in Germany:  
A Social Network Analysis 
Having analyzed recruitment patterns of German CEOs, we turn now to the 
structure of German corporate networks. Specifically, the methods of Social 
Network Analysis (SNA) will be used to examine a variety of ties between 
CEOs. The instruments of network analysis have been little used to study Ger-
man corporate careers or corporate governance in general (Entorf et al. 2009, 
1116). Most of the existing studies using SNA have dealt with the issue of 
interlocking directorates (e.g., Kengelbach and Roos 2006). 
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Method and data: We will study the ties between CEO candidates based on 
a structural approach. In this article, four types of ties between the CEOs will 
be studied. All ties are defined in advance and will be measured for each CEO 
in order to avoid selection bias (Keller 2018). Two types of ties are related to 
the experience of the candidates before their recruitment: alumni-network ties 
(e.g., education at the same university or participation in the same vocational 
training) and coworker ties resulting from working experience in the same 
company (or in the same company group). In addition to ties based on shared 
experience, we will take into account ties based on policy-relevant networks 
through which the candidates connect with colleagues across companies and 
economic sectors. These policy-relevant network ties include connections 
through membership in nonprofit organizations (e.g., the board of trustees or 
advisory board of a museum or gallery) and memberships in various think 
tanks. 
Measuring networks through the aforementioned ties has certain shortcom-
ings. Most importantly, it is not a precise way of inferring actual trust ties: 
members of the same company may have been competitors; students from the 
same university may in fact never have met during their studies; members of 
the same think tank may pursue different interests. Although this measure is 
imprecise for the capture of trust ties or reputational networks, it does not pro-
duce a systematic bias that would impact a study of the overall structure of the 
network (Keller 2018). 
For the purposes of this SNA, the data collected on the recruitment of Ger-
man CEOs in 2012 and 2015 were coded in a format that facilitates analysis 
using UCINet software (Borgatti et al. 2002). The connections between the 
CEO candidates were coded as present or absent (using binary variables) if two 
candidates had gained experience at the same organization (e.g., the same com-
pany) during his or her career. The noteworthy shortcomings of this coding is 
that the direction of the ties (i.e., whether the candidates knew each other 
equally or one had more knowledge of the other) and the strength of ties (i.e., 
whether or not the connection was very friendly) were not taken into account. 
Although this information may provide additional insights into the value of 
networks for the recruitment of German CEOs, its collection involves the use 
of in-depth interviews of elite members, which may lead to a systematic bias in 
the selection of the respondents. 
4.1  Four Types of Networks of German CEOs 
This section presents different types of networks that are relevant for CEOs’ 
career paths, along with the essential characteristic of each network.2 Alumni 
                                                             
2  The examined networks will be visualized using the NetDraw package of the UCINet (Bor-
gatti 2002). The individuals’ positions in the figures presented in this article are generated 
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networks, which consist of ties based on shared college or university attend-
ance, are low-density. Their density (i.e., the proportion of all possible dyadic 
connections between actors that are actually present) is as high as 0.02 (i.e., 
2%), although compared to 2012, the number of alumni ties in 2015 is slightly 
higher (Figures 1 and 2). The largest component of this network includes 
alumni of four German universities: the RWTH Aachen, Ruhr-University of 
Bochum, University of Münster, and University of Cologne. Some researchers 
attribute the low importance of alumni connections for corporate recruitment in 
Germany to the absence of elite universities in Germany (Hartmann 2018). 
Figure 1: University Networks of German CEOs in 2012 
Source: author’s own calculations. 
                                                                                                                                
by the graph-theoretical layout “Spring Embedding”. The algorithm uses iterative fitting (i.e. 
start with a random graph, measure fit; move some node, measure fit again and so on) to 
locate the points in such a way as to put those with smallest path lengths to one another 
closest in the graph. Two nodes are “similar” if they have similar shortest paths (geodesic 
distances) to all other nodes. The geodesic distance is the number of relations in the short-
est possible walk from one actor to another. For a better visualization, I used the optional 
“node repulsion” criterion that creates separation between nodes that would otherwise be 
located very close to one another. The absolute location of the nodes (left-right, top-down) 
does not have any specific meaning, similarly to the position of isolates (nodes without any 
connections). 
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Figure 2: University Networks of German CEOs in 2015 
Source: author’s own calculations. 
 
In contrast, the networks of co-workers (i.e., ties between those who have 
worked in the same company or corporate group during their earlier careers) 
have become less dense over time (Figures 3 and 4). While in 2012, the aver-
age number of co-worker ties for each German CEO was as high as 3.2, it 
decreased to 2.1 in 2015. The density of this kind of network decreased from 
0.04 to 0.02. Although these densities appear to be low, it is still noteworthy 
that over the course of their careers, German CEOs shared a working environ-
ment (a company or a corporate group) with a fellow CEO at least twice. 
Such a massive change in co-worker networks from 2012 till 2015 may be 
an indicator that Deutschland AG slowly disintegrates. Different branches of 
industry are building their networks, which increases the segmentation of co-
worker network. Another structural change that plays a crucial role in network 
disintegration is globalization. Even in international comparison, the proportion 
of German CEOs who had gained international experience before their recruit-
ment is high (compare, PWC 2018). Unfortunately, international networks of 
CEOs were not captured in this study. 
Moreover, in the world comparison, careers of German corporate elites are 
highly volatile. Corporate turnover in Germany stems from both regular (i.e., 
the end of CEO’s contract), corporate (i.e., turnover due to a merger between 
two companies or takeover), and economic (e.g., bad financial performance) 
reasons (compare, PWC 2018). Moreover, some CEOs resigned because of 
scandals, as was the case with Martin Winterkorn, former CEO of the 
Volkswagen AG and Porsche Automobile Holding SE. This manager was the 
most central in German corporate network – both in the number of direct ties 
and in his betweenness position in the overall network and his removal has 
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reduced the overall network density. Because of a massive turnover, in 2015, 
the co-worker network consisted of a set of highly dense groups (cliques) and 
numerous isolates, i.e., CEOs without any connections to other network mem-
bers. 
Figure 3: Coworker Networks of German CEOs in 2012 
Source: author’s own calculations. 
Figure 4: Coworker Networks of German CEOs in 2015 
Source: author’s own calculations. 
 
Studying policy-relevant networks, the density of ties through the same NGOs 
is even lower than those of alumni networks (0.01), with the decrease in the 
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average number of ties from 0.4 (2012) to 0.2 (2015). Surprisingly, the en-
gagement of German CEOs in various non-profit organizations and boards of 
universities, museums, and foundations was relatively low and even decreased 
over time. In contrast, the CEOs of American companies actively use the in-
strument of “strategic philanthropy” (Saiia et al. 2003) to provide positive news 
about their companies and to realize their strategic interests. In his analysis of 
corporate philanthropy, Fifka (2013) discovered that compared to the US sys-
tem, in which “giving back” behavior among large corporations is culturally 
and politically desirable, in Germany, corporations rely on income redistribu-
tion and taxation as important instruments of support that replace the need for 
philanthropy. This may account for the low levels of participation of German 
CEOs in non-profit organizational networks. 
Out of all analyzed networks, the one with the highest density is based on 
ties through participation in the same think tank or policy association. In the 
2012 think-tank networks, a CEO shared on average 5.8 ties with other CEOs, 
while in 2015, the average number of ties decreased slightly to 4.8 (Figures 5 
and 6). The density of this kind of network was as high as 0.05-0.07. The range 
of policy-oriented think tanks and policy-relevant associations includes the 
Atlantik-Brücke (the private and non-profit organization with the goal of 
strengthening relations between the US and Germany), various associations 
(e.g., of the automobile and chemical industries), and various entrepreneurial 
organizations and think tanks, both at the national and European levels. Active 
participation of top managers in various policy organizations results from many 
reasons. Organizations such as the Atlantik-Brücke allow corporate and politi-
cal elites to build networks; members of the Atlantik-Brücke have included the 
Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, as well as acting and former ministers 
and parliamentarians of the European Parliament and German Bundestag. 
Moreover, this organization includes high-ranking members from the US, 
providing an additional incentive for top managers of German “global player” 
companies to join. Participation in different policy associations establishes ties 
across industries and within industries. It also supports the diffusion of innova-
tions and contributes to the lobbying activities of companies (Ronit and 
Schneider 1998). 
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Figure 5: Think-Tank and Policy-Association Networks of German CEOs in 2012 
Source: author’s own calculations. 
Figure 6: Think-Tank and Policy-Association Networks of German CEOs in 2015 
Source: author’s own calculations. 
 
Finally, Figures 7 and 8 present ties from all of the examined networks between 
German CEOs. As the figures show, the number of isolates (i.e., CEOs without 
any ties in any of the examined networks) has increased from 2012 to 2015 
(partly because of massive fluctuation in German corporate leadership). The 
overall network, however, has become more compact (with a density of 0.03); 
in other words, the CEOs share more ties to each other. One can assume that 
CEOs may be engaged on different networks (e.g., policy organizations) in 
order to compensate for the dissolution of co-worker networks. 
In addition to the overall structure of corporate networks (e.g., the number 
of ties in each network; Figures 7 and 8), the substructures of these networks 
HSR 43 (2018) 4  │  90 
are of interest here – particularly extended dense clusters of people, referred to 
as “cliques.” These substructures are crucial for a better understanding of mobi-
lization and diffusion as well as lines of cleavage within networks.  
In all of the networks described above, in 2012, nine cliques were discov-
ered. Interestingly, membership in these cliques is not exclusive, and some 
CEOs participated in two cliques. Nevertheless, the overall CEO network in-
cluded two large groups consisting of four and two cliques respectively. The 
remaining three cliques had fewer members and set themselves apart from 
other groups. Of all of the CEOs from the top 100 companies, the core corpo-
rate elite consists of 29 people who are well-connected in the overall network. 
The density of this core of corporate elites is 0.06 (i.e., 6%), which is rather 
high. This core corporate elite comprises the significant brokers between dif-
ferent corporate groups and therefore enjoys a strategically prominent position 
in the network. These cliques consist of CEOs from different industries (such 
as the automobile industry, transport, and retail). The sector with the highest 
representation among these central CEOs is the energy industry (with six 
CEOs). One of the CEOs from the energy sector – Hans-Jürgen Brick (one of 
the members of the management board of the Amprion) – occupies a particular-
ly important brokerage position by connecting two cliques to one larger clique. 
Four mostly central CEOs come from the chemistry industry, with Dr. Kurt 
Bock (the CEO of BASF) holding a prominent brokerage position. 
Figure 7: The Overall Corporate Network of German CEOs in 2012 
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Figure 8: The Overall Corporate Network of German CEOs in 2015 
 
The nature of the analyzed networks raises other questions about their impact 
on corporate managers’ careers. For example, are two CEOs who share one of 
these kinds of ties also more likely to share other networks? One can assume 
that two CEOs who studied at the same university, later worked at the same 
company, and established ties with the same think tank (i.e., amassing common 
experiences) are likely to experience a sense of shared trust, making the estab-
lishment of further ties more likely. The hypothesis is, therefore, that the matri-
ces of ties we examine will be positively correlated to each other. Based on the 
results of quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) correlation analysis (Krack-
hardt 1987), this hypothesis was partly supported. Of all the different ties de-
scribed here, in 2012 the engagement of two CEOs in the same NGO signifi-
cantly correlated with participation in the same think tanks (Pearson’s r = 0.16, 
p < 0.001). In 2015, this correlation became marginally significant (Pearson’s r 
= 0.08, p < 0.01). It is worth noting that alumni and coworker ties also correlat-
ed in both data sets, but the effect size was negligible in both cases. 
5.  Conclusion 
This article analyzed the recruitment of CEOs at the 100 largest German com-
panies, focusing on how the transition from Deutschland AG to integration 
with European and global markets has impacted the overall recruitment and 
career patterns of German CEOs. Taking into account the development of 
corporate recruitment patterns, this study found signs of both continuity and 
change. It was striking to note that the percentage of technically educated Ger-
man CEOs was still quite high in the 2010s. At this point in time the German 
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corporate elite continued to resemble their political counterparts in that they 
were not only highly educated (Best, Hausmann and Schmitt 2000) but in many 
cases even had PhDs. In addition to providing new findings about the recruit-
ment of CEOs, these results support the thesis of some researchers specializing 
in the corporate elite (in particular, Hartmann 2006) that German CEO recruit-
ment practices have not undergone any radical changes. 
Other results of this study are more in keeping with the expectations regard-
ing changes in German CEO recruitment patterns in light of pressures on the 
corporate model from integration into the international market and reunifica-
tion. German companies have become more oriented toward financial perfor-
mance and benchmarking. This orientation has led to the increased recruitment 
of CEOs with an educational background in economics and finance, particular-
ly in the late 2000s and 2010s. Moreover, the orientation toward markets and 
financial performance has contributed to the decline in the tenure of German 
CEOs in the 2010s compared to their counterparts in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The professionalization of managerial positions in Germany and a gradually 
opening recruitment market also reflect the changing orientation of German 
corporate culture toward international markets. A proven track record as CEO 
or at least service in the executive board of directors has become an informal 
prerequisite for CEO candidates. The recruitment market for CEOs has opened 
up beyond in-house candidates only gradually, and mostly to include candi-
dates from subsidiary companies within the same company group. This change 
came about as a result of German corporate decentralization in the late 1980s 
and 1990s. These findings support the argument about professionalization and 
marketization of corporate recruitment in post-Deutschland AG period made by 
some researchers in the field of economic sociology (e.g., Höpner 2003; Beyer 
2006; Freye 2010). The long-term consequences of marketization and profes-
sionalization of corporate recruitment are likely to be more sustainable than 
patterns of continuity. If they become stable over time, one can expect the 
gradual creation of a new type of German capitalism, probably more compara-
ble to the Anglo-Saxon model. 
To look more deeply at the way corporate elites in Germany have structured 
in the 2010s, this study used a Social Network Analysis of Germany’s corpo-
rate elite to focus on the overall corporate network and its components, includ-
ing informal networking structures that influence career paths and recruitment. 
The study finds that the density of the overall corporate network in Germany 
has increased from 2012 to 2015, which corresponds to the increased number 
of CEOs with shared alumni experience as well as with additional connections 
through various policy associations. The structure of the corporate network is 
not unified but consists of a set of highly dense groups (cliques), in which 
members are more closely connected to each other than to other members of 
the corporate network who are not associated with these substructures. Cliques 
are central to the entire network and fulfill brokerage functions such as the 
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integration of the corporate network as well as the distribution of information 
and resources within the network. 
According to the SNA, some of the networks (i.e., alumni and nonprofit 
groups) play a relatively inconsequential role in connecting German CEOs. The 
absence of elite universities in the German educational system means that 
alumni networks play a minor role among corporate elites in Germany com-
pared to other countries (e.g., the UK and the US). The low participation levels 
of German CEOs in various nonprofit organizations (such as scientific founda-
tions and boards of museums and galleries) indicate that philanthropy, too, is 
less essential in Germany than in countries such as the US, where philanthropy 
plays a central role in corporate image. Both findings underline essential struc-
tural differences between German and the Anglo-Saxon corporate cultures. 
The coworker network, however, appears to play an important role in estab-
lishing ties between German CEOs. Considering the variety of companies and 
corporate groups operating within the German market, it is striking that accord-
ing to the data for the two years selected (2012 and 2015), German CEOs on 
average shared at least two workplaces over the course of their careers. The 
most surprising finding from the network analysis was the high frequency of 
ties between CEOs because of joint participation in various think tanks and 
policy associations. On average, in 2012 and 2015, CEOs shared five to six 
policy association ties, which allowed them to establish connections both with-
in and between different industrial sectors. Because in Germany, the proportion 
of political elites recruited from large enterprises has been low (Best et al. 
2018), policy networks allow CEOs to establish ties between the corporate and 
the political elites in Germany and abroad. This finding may serve as an indica-
tor of intense policy networking in the German political system. 
This study provides a more nuanced view than has previously been available 
of what is behind the changes in the German corporate network and recruitment 
and career patterns of the country’s corporate elite since the shift toward in-
creased integration with international markets. The approach taken here opens 
up avenues for further research on change in German corporate structures. 
Using a controlled longitudinal study, it should be possible to establish more 
clear-cut connections between the changes in the corporate environment and 
the recruitment patterns of CEOs than have been found to date. A controlled 
longitudinal study would eliminate some of the bias and comparison problems 
in existing studies, many of which used different or even incompatible method-
ologies, examples, and observation periods. Social Network Analysis is an 
important tool for studying corporate structure in different contexts, but it is 
necessary to go beyond the existing studies on interlocking directorates and 
examine more closely how ties between CEOs emerge and change over time. 
For a better understanding of policy networks and their functioning in the Ger-
man system, sector-specific ties, as well as ties among different industrial sec-
tors, should be studied. The use of a reputational survey of German CEOs 
HSR 43 (2018) 4  │  94 
would allow future studies to include a network analysis of trust and friendship 
ties between CEOs and how they affect corporate cooperation and perfor-
mance. Taking into account these additional data sources would allow re-
searchers to go beyond standard descriptions of recruitment patterns and open 
up “the black box” of corporate recruitment in the post-Deutschland AG peri-
od. 
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